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0 Introduction
Some analogies have been observed over the years between the semantics of
pronouns, tenses and moods. Thus Partee 1973 suggested that tenses have all
the uses that pronouns do, and should thus receive the same abstract analysis;
her argument was then extended to mood in Stone 1997. Consider for instance
the deictic use of pronouns, illustrated in (1)a.  Partee's and Stone's suggestion
was that tenses and moods have an entirely analogous use, illustrated in (1)b-c
(in the logical forms, ÿ represents negation and P represents the past tense
operator):
(1) a. She left me  (Partee 1973)
a1. Left-me(x0)




c. My neighbors would kill me (Stone 1997)
c1. K(w0)
(1)a can be used even when she has no linguistic antecedent, provided that
some female individual is salient in the extra-linguistic context (in Partee's
scenario, a man sitting on a bench is holding his head in his hands as he utters
the sentence; one can infer without difficulty which individual is meant by
she). This can be analyzed as in (1)a1, where a variable is left free and
receives a value from the extra-linguistic context.  Partee's observation was
that the same analysis carries over to tense in (1)b, uttered by someone who
has just left her house. Her claim was that none of the analyses offered by a
standard modal theory will do; for in such theories a past tense is analyzed as a
temporal operator with existential force, as in b1 and b2. However the
sentence can neither have the logical form in b1 (‘at no point in the past did I
turn off the stove’ - uninformative because trivially false) nor that in b2 (‘there
is some point in the past at which I didn't turn off the stove’ - uninformative
                                                 
1The first part of this paper develops in greater detail suggestions that are only sketched in
Schlenker 2002a. As is made clear in the text, the second part of the account owes much to
Abusch 1997 and Heim 1994b, although the technical implementation is rather different.
Thanks to O. Percus for discussion, to B. Lenoir for help with the French data, and to J.
Lecarme and J. Guéron for helpful comments. This paper was already completed when I read
the first version of von Stechow 2002, which offers a different -and very elegant-
implementation of ideas related to those I develop in Section 1.
2because trivially true). The problem disappears if the past tense is treated as a
free time variable, whose value is provided by the context of utterance, as in
(1)b3.  Finally, in the scenario for (1)c, due to  Stone 1997, one of the guests at
a party starts turning up the volume of the stereo. The host disapproves, and
utters (1)c. The intended meaning is that 'my neighbors would kill me in that
world or in those worlds in which your action is completed'. The extra-
linguistic context (the guest's gesture) is enough to provide a value for the free
variable in (1)c1.  A natural conclusion is that if pronouns are analyzed as
introducing (free or bound) individual variables in syntactic representations,
tense and mood should, by parity of reasoning, be taken to introduce time and
world variables, and not operators, as posited in Modal and Tense Logic2.
Once pronouns, tenses and moods are uniformly treated as variables, it
is natural to suggest that pronominal, temporal and modal features should also
be analyzed in a uniform fashion. Cooper 1983 treated pronominal features
such as gender as presuppositions on the value of individual variables.
Extending this view to tense, Heim 1994b suggested that temporal features are
presuppositions on the values of time variables; and some have tried to extend
a similar analysis to mood (see von Fintel 1997; Schlenker 2002b). Further
attempts have sought to relate the cross-linguistic typologies found in the
temporal and in the personal or modal domains. I tried to argue in Schlenker
2002a that both tense and person display a distinction between indexicals that
can be evaluated only with respect to the context of the actual speech act
('unshiftable indexicals') and indexicals that can be evaluated either with
respect to the context of the actual speech act or with respect to the context of
a reported speech act ('shiftable indexicals'). While the English present tense
and the English first person pronoun belong to the first category, the Russian
present tense and the Amharic first person marker belong to the second, as is
suggested by the following data:
                                                 
2As is well-known, the pronouns-as-variables theory encounters problems in the analysis of
'donkey sentences'. These can be solved by developing systems of dynamic semantics, as in
Kamp 1981 or Heim 1982; or by re-analyzing pronouns as concealed definite descriptions, as
is done (among others) in Heim 1990, Schein 1993 and Ludlow 1994. In the latter case,
pronominal, temporal and modal features should be seen as falling within the restrictor of the
definite description. On a Strawsonian or Fregean treatment of 'the'  it would then follow that
these features trigger presuppositions.
3(2) a. petjai skazal, c‡to oni plac‡et (Russian)
     Petjai  said   that hei is-crying
‘Petja said that he was crying [at the time of his utterance]’
a'. #Peteri said a week ago that hei is crying.
b. j&on j&´gna  n´-n)n)  yˆl -all  (Amharic)
John hero be.PF-1SO 3M.say-AUX.3M
“John says that he is a hero”
b'. ≠John says that I am a hero
In (2)a the tense of the embedded clause can (in an intuitive sense) denote the
time of Petja's utterance; this is not in general possible in English, as is seen
by the deviance of (2)a'.3 Similarly in (2)b the Amharic first person pronoun
may denote the speaker of the reported speech act, something which is not
possible in English, as shown by (2)b'4.
If at least some of the preceding observations are on the right track, one
should ask how far the analogy between tenses, pronouns and moods really
extends. In this paper I offer two limited suggestions: the first one is that,
under certain commonly held assumptions, the device of 'Sequence of Tense
rules', postulated to account for Tense Agreement in indirect discourse,
should be extended to person and mood. The second is that so-called Double
Access Readings in the tense domain have a purely modal counterpart, which I
seek to analyze by offering a generalization of the theory of tense developed in
Abusch 1997.  In the spirit of Partee 1973, Kratzer 1998, Stone 1997 and
Bittner 2001, the goal will thus be to enlarge somewhat the list of phenomena
that can receive a unified analysis across tense, person and mood.
To put things in sharper focus, let us first consider the original motivation
for positing Tense Agreement rules ('Sequence of Tense rules'). Without such
rules one could claim, as Enç 1987 did, that temporal features are always
semantically interpreted - no doubt an attractive theory. That it isn't viable is
shown by the following example, originally due to Kamp & Rohrer (the
present version is slightly modified from Abusch 1997):
(3) John decided yesterday that tomorrow he would tell his mother that they
were having their last meal together.
                                                 
3 In Double Access Readings in English, a present tense embedded under an attitude verb in
the past tense may denote an interval that includes the time of utterance, but only if it also
includes the time of the attitude (or to put it more precisely: the time that the agent thinks is
the time of his thought or speech act). This standard observation is discussed below.
4 A further observation is that the distinction between ' shiftable' and ' unshiftable' indexicals is
naturally extended to encompass indexicals that are obligatorily shifted, and are thus
systematically evaluated with respect to the context of a reported speech act. A natural
suggestion is that logophoric pronouns (as found for instance in Ewe, see Clements 1975)
belong to this third category. I argued in Schlenker 2002a that the latter also includes a kind of
'logophoric mood', the German 'Konjunktiv 1', which is in some ways formally analogous to
logophoric pronouns.
4Since the meal is supposed to take place tomorrow, its time of occurrence
follows each of the moments that are salient in the discourse, and in particular
the time of utterance. Thus any theory that claims that the past tense of were
expresses anteriority with respect to some other moment (e.g. the time of
utterance) is bound to go wrong in this case. As a first approximation, the facts
can be handled by postulating that a tense T2 embedded under an attitude verb
with tense T1 may inherit in a purely morphological fashion (i.e. without
semantic consequences) the tense features of T1 if T1 and T2 are interpreted as
being (in a sense to be clarified below) coreferential. Alternatively, one could
say, following Ogihara 1996, that the tense features of T2 are present
throughout the syntactic derivation, but are eliminated right before semantic
interpretation by a rule of Tense Deletion. For our purposes both formulations
will do: if would is analyzed as the past tense of will (as is commonly
assumed), the representation in (4) is obtained, where will-ed inherits its past
tense features from decid-ed, and transmits them in turn to were. Since the
inheritance process is morphological, the tense features of were do not have to
be interpreted semantically, as is desired:
(4)  John decid-ed that he will-ed tell his mother that they were having their last meal
together.
 agreement agreement
In the first part of this paper,  I suggest (following Heim 1994a) that in exactly
the same syntactic configuration the masculine features of he and himself in
(5) can also be ignored.  And we will see that the same facts appear to hold,
mutatis mutandis, of the indicative mood features of is in (6):
(5) a. John hopes that he will buy himself a car
b. John hopes PRO to buy himself a car
(6) John is thinking (at this very moment) that Mary is pregnant.
In the second part of this paper, I consider what happens when Tense
Agreement fails to hold, especially when a present tense is embedded under a
past tense attitude verb. A grammatical sentence can then be obtained, but it
has a peculiar ('Double Access') reading whereby the agent's attitude somehow
has to be both about the time (that he thinks is the time) of this thought act and
about the time of the speaker's utterance; this explains why (7)a (by contrast
with (7)a') is incoherent, since John presumably knows that a pregnancy
cannot span two years. No such effect holds when the Sequence of Tense rule
is applied, as shown by (7)a'-b':
(7) a. #Two years ago John claim-ed that Mary is pregnant.
b. Ok Two days ago John claim-ed that Mary is pregnant.
a'. Ok Two years ago John claim-ed that Mary was pregnant.
b'. Ok Two days ago John claim-ed that Mary was pregnant.
We will see that an analogous contrast can be replicated with mood, as in the
French examples in (8):
5(8) a. Je crains qu'un jour Jean apprenne que Marie est enceinte
   I fear-ind that some day Jean learn-subj that Marie is-ind pregnant
'I am afraid some day Jean will learn that Mary is pregnant'
b. Je crains qu'un jour Jean apprenne que Marie soit enceinte
  I fear-ind that some day Jean learn-subj that Marie is-subj pregnant
'I am afraid some day Jean will learn that Mary is pregnant'
The first verb ('fear') serves to force the appearance of subjunctive mood on
the second ('learn').  The speaker has the option of applying mood agreement
between the second verb ('learn') and the third ('be pregnant'), marking the
latter as subjunctive; or he may simply mark the last verb as indicative. We
will see that in the latter case the world equivalent of a Double Access
Reading is obtained, whereby what Jean learns in the situations that the
speaker fears must be both about the situations in question and about the
actual world (similar examples, in fact more robust ones, can be replicated
with a morphological present or past tense interpreted in a purely modal
fashion in the antecedent of a conditional, as in (31) and (32) below; the
advantage of concentrating on French is that examples with a morphological
subjunctive are available in a broader range of contexts). I will try to account
for this observation by developing a somewhat generalized version of the
theory of Abusch 1997, and especially of her 'Upper Limit Constraint'.
 Although I have tried to keep the following discussion reasonably
precise, some of the formal details have been omitted; they are more fully laid
out in the Appendix, where a full fragment is developed. The reader will
observe that the syntax I assume throughout is much simpler than that of
English or French.  This is an idealization, designed to make the semantic
discussion more tractable. I trust that the basic mechanisms I posit - in
particular, my rules of agreement-  can be adapted to any reasonable syntactic
analysis. (See von Stechow 2002 for a more realistic implementation of
related ideas).
1 Tense Agreement, Person Agreement, Mood Agreement
1.1 The Necessity of Rules of Person Agreement
Why should one need rules of person agreement to handle attitude verbs? The
argument, first made (to my knowledge) in Heim 1994a, has the following
logic:
(i) In some cases, a pronoun embedded under an attitude verb cannot literally
be interpreted as being 'De Re', and thus coreferential with an argument of the
super-ordinate clause. This arises when the pronoun is read 'De Se', and thus
unambiguously reports a first person thought.
(ii) Still, in these cases the embedded pronoun agrees in features with the
corresponding argument of the super-ordinate clause (i.e. an individual
pronoun agrees with the subject of the embedding verb, a time argument
agrees with the super-ordinate tense, etc.). This holds in some cases in which a
6presupposition failure would be predicted if the pronominal features were
semantically interpreted.
1.1.1 De Se Readings
To see why a problem arises in the first place, consider the following example,
first analyzed in a different guise by Morgan 1970 and Chierchia 1987 (this
version is from Schlenker 2002a):
(9) Situation: John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in
the election.  He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a
terrific candidate, who should  definitely be elected.  Unbeknownst to
John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John himself.
a. True: John hopes that he will be elected
b. False/#: John hopes PRO to be elected [Ok if the thought was: ‘I
should be elected’]
In this far-fetched situation a surprising nuance appears between (9)a and (9)b.
Somehow using the infinitive entails that John's hope was of the form I will be
elected ('De Se reading'), rather than He will be elected, where he refers -
unbeknownst to him- to John himself. Lest the reader think that this contrast
can be reduced to the distinction between 'bound variable readings' and
'accidental coreference', I note (with virtually everyone who has worked on
this topic) that this is not so. If several candidates watch themselves on
different TVs without recognizing themselves, one may say truly that 'Every
candidate hopes that he will be elected', but not that 'Every candidate hopes to
be elected'. The De Se/De Re distinction is preserved in sentences that only
have a bound variable reading.
Chierchia 1987 analyzed the problem by suggesting that PRO, the
unpronounced subject of an infinitive, can only be read De Se. His solution
was to revise the semantics of attitude verbs, and to suggest that (9)b doesn't
simply establish a relation between John and the set of worlds w in which
John is elected, but rather a relation between John and the set of
individual/world pairs <x, w> such that x is elected in w. In other words, John
doesn't simply hope to live in a world in which John is elected; rather, he
wants to be one of the individuals that get elected (or to put it differently he
stands in the relation of 'hope' to the set of pairs <x, w> such that the
individual x is elected in the world w>. This approach is naturally extended to
tense (as in Abusch 1997), so that in the end hope is taken to establish a
relation between John and the set of triples of the form <x, t, w> such that x is
elected at t in w. The upshot is to replace the analysis of  hope given by (10)
with the one in (11).  As in the Appendix, truth and denotation are relativized
to an assignment of values to variables (s) and to a context of utterance (c*);
using standard notations, s[wiÆw] is the assignment which is identical to s,
except that it assigns to the variable wi the value w. (In my highly simplified
7syntax, world or context variables are written on complementizers, though
nothing essential hinges on this.)
(10) John hopes thatwi j is trues, c* iff every world w compatible with John’s
hope is such that j  is trues[wiÆw], c*
(11) John hopes that<xi, tj, wk> j  is trues, c* iff every triple <x, t, w> compatible
with John’s hope is such that j  is trues[xiÆx, tjÆt, wkÆw], c*.
The contrast between (9)a and (9)b can then be derived by positing that (for
whatever reasons) PRO must be coindexed with the first coordinate of the
triple <xi, tj, wk>, while no such requirement holds of he (e.g. in (12)a hexm is
a free variable which is taken to denote John5). For readability I will
sometimes replace that with to, without giving any account of the difference;
and as is done in the Appendix, time and world arguments of a predicate are
explicitly represented as suffixes:
(12) a. John hopes that<xi, tj, wk> hexm be-elected-tj-wk  is trues, c* iff for every
triple <x, t, w> compatible with John’s hope, s(xm), i.e. John,  is elected
at t in w.
b. John hopes to<xi, tj, wk> PROxi be-elected-tj-wk  is trues, c* iff for every
triple <x, t, w> compatible with John’s hope, x is elected at t in w.
This appears to derive the correct truth-conditions. In order to account for the
non-standard behavior of the  indexicals discussed in (2), we may restate this
analysis by observing that a triple of the form <x, t, w> can be identified with
a context, i.e. a point at which an act of thought or of speech could originate6.
Such a re-analysis has the advantage of explaining why certain indexicals that
are in the scope of an attitude operator appear to be evaluated with respect to
the context of the reported speech act, as was  shown in (2). The semantic rule
in (11) can then be re-written as in (13)a, and the analysis in (12) can be
restated as in (13)b, where cA  denotes the author of the context c, cT its time of
occurrence and cW its world of occurrence (again, the switch from that to to is
for convenience only):
(13) a.John hopes thatc1 j is trues, c* iff for every context c compatible with
John’s hope,  j  is trues[c1->c], c*
b. John hopes toc1  PROc1A be-elected-c1T-c1W is trues, c* iff  for every
                                                 
5 If John were replaced with a quantifier or a l-abstractor, hexm could be bound. Thus to
account for the contrast between 'Every candidate hopes to be elected' and 'Every candidate
hopes to be elected' we may posit the following logical forms:
(i) a. [Every candidate]xm [txm hopes that<xi, tj, wk> hexm be-elected-tj-wk]
b. [Every candidate]xm [txm hopes to<xi, tj, wk> PROxi be-elected-tj-wk]
6 This is a slight simplification. The identification is possible only if x exist at t in w (if this
condition is not met, there is presumably no context that corresponds to <x, t, w>).
8context c compatible with John’s hope, the agent of c is elected at the
time of c in the world of c.
Within this framework, the embedded present tense of the Russian example in
(2)a is simply taken to spell-out the term c1T, the time coordinate of the
embedded context c1; while the embedded first person pronoun in the Amharic
example in (2)b is the morphological reflex of the author coordinate c1A of c1.
The latter case is illustrated in (14), which can be seen to be semantically
analogous to (13)b:
(14) John says thatc1 c1A be-a-hero-c1T-c1W (Amharic) is trues, c* iff for every
context compatible with John’s claim, the agent of c is a hero at the time
of c in the world of c.
1.1.2 Sequence of Person Rules
Whether one adopts the system in (11) or that in (15), the same formal
problem arises: even though in a pre-theoretical sense PRO is coreferent with
John, the analysis does not establish any formal link between the two. And yet
PRO does appear to inherit the features of John, since it can transmit them to a
reflexive pronoun that it binds locally, as in (15):
(15) John hopes PROi to buy himselfi a car
Of course one could claim that the masculine features of himself are there
because they are semantically interpreted - after all, it is reasonable to
presuppose in (15) that the denotation of PRO, and thus also of himself, is
indeed a male individual. Unfortunately even when this is not the case the
sentence remains grammatical, contrary to one's initial expectations (this
example is from Schlenker 2002a):
(16) John (a transsexual) hopes PRO to become a woman, and he hopes PROi
to buy himselfi (*herselfi) a car.
Since attitude verbs are analyzed as structures of universal quantification over
contexts, the first conjunct asserts that for every context c compatible with
John's hope, the author of c is a woman.  But standard rules of presupposition
projection applied to the second conjunct lead one to expect that for every
context c compatible with John's hope, the author of c should be male
(because 'himself' triggers a presupposition that the denotation of PRO should
be male).7 As a result, (16) as a whole should be incoherent, contrary to fact8.
                                                 
7 This is because in structures of restricted universal quantification presupposition projection
requires that every element (in fact, assignment function) that satisfies the restrictor should
satisfy the presuppositions of the nuclear scope. For instance in 'Every director admires
herself', the expected presupposition is that every director should be female - hence the
impression  that the speaker is presupposing that every director in the domain of discourse is a
woman (this holds only in non-politically correct English). The same reasoning applies to
attitude verbs as we analyze them (the role of the restrictor is played by the set of contexts
compatible with the agent's attitude).
9In sum, within the present framework it cannot be argued that the
features of the embedded PRO or of the reflexive 'himself' are semantically
licensed. The problem is familiar from the research on De Se readings, and it
has lead Heim 1994a to state purely morphological rules of agreement
between PRO and the matrix subject. While the agreement rules that are
posited by each theory of De Se readings are bound to be somewhat
stipulative9, it is noteworthy that the problem they are designed to solve has a
direct counterpart in the tense literature. Consider the example in (17)a, whose
embedded tense is interpreted De Se, i.e. as the time coordinate of the
embedded context. One could either posit a logical form as in b. or as in c.:
(17) a. She thought that he (e.g. Clinton) was president  (Simultaneous
reading, temporal De Se)
b. she1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1  he2 be-president-pastc1 T-c1W
c. she1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1  he2 be-president-c1
 
T-c1W
In b. the embedded past tense morpheme is assumed to be visible for semantic
interpretation, while in c. it is assumed to be semantically invisible, and thus
to be present in the pronunciation only (in the latter case one must explain
how a post-syntactic rule may transform c
1
 
T into a past tense morpheme; this
is discussed below). If the past tense features are semantically interpreted, they
should contribute a presupposition that c
1
 
T denotes a moment prior to the time
of the context of utterance c*. If so standard rules of presupposition projection
would predict the following (slightly simplified) definedness conditions,
where the predicate be weirds, c*  is used in the meta-language to indicate
presupposition failure with respect to an assignment function s and a context
of utterance c* (the conditions are simplified because I only consider cases of
presupposition failure that are triggered by the embedded past tense; a more
complete treatment is given in the Appendix):
(18)   (17)b is weirds, c* iff ... for some context c compatible with what s(x1)
believes at time s(t1) in world s(w1), cT is not prior to c*T...
As has been observed in the literature, this prediction is incorrect.  Even if the
agent of the attitude thinks that the time of her thought act is after the time at
which the sentence is uttered, the grammaticality of our example remains
unaffected. This is brought out by the following variation of (17)a (also from
Schlenker 2002a):
                                                                                                                                
8 The precise reasoning is as follows: since the first conjunct (16) asserts that all contexts
compatible with John's hope are contexts whose agent is a woman, this fact should be a
presupposition of the second conjunct. This should suffice to license the feminine features on
herself, while himself should be disallowed, contrary to what is observed.
9 However see Heim 2002 for an attempt to relate these rules to a more general mechanism of
feature transmission under binding.
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(19) [Uttered in 2002]
In 1999 Mary believed that she was already in year 2005, and she
thought that he (e.g. Clinton) was still president
Here the first conjunct asserts (on a temporal De Se reading) that for each
context c compatible with Mary's belief,  the time of c is after the time of
utterance (=2002). But in the second conjunct the past tense of 'was' triggers a
presupposition that the time of each context compatible with Mary's belief
should be before the time of utterance. This raises an obvious problem for the
theory. There are two ways to solve it:
(i) We could deny that such examples involve a De Se reading. In the case of
PRO, this option was not open because we had semantic evidence that PRO is
not simply read De Re. But to my knowledge no analogous argument has been
given in the case of tense. In fact, on anybody's theory it is very hard to see
how the past tense could fail to have, among others, a De Re reading. Thus the
issue is a particularly subtle one: on the assumption that the embedded tense
has a De Re reading, can we find evidence that it also has a De Se reading? An
equally difficult problem would have been raised if we had asked whether he,
which uncontroversially has a De Re reading, also has a separate De Se
reading10. The heart of the difficulty is that a De Se reading is standardly
assumed to entail the corresponding De Re reading. Thus the task is to argue
for the separate existence of a 'strong' reading (the De Se reading), which
asymmetrically entails a 'weak' reading (the De Re reading). This is a
somewhat nightmarish situation for the semanticist, since any situation
compatible with the strong reading will ipso facto be compatible with the
weak reading - which leaves open the possibility that only the latter exists
(that is, that the 'strong reading' is in fact no reading at all, but just a borderline
case of the weak reading;  see Fauconnier 1975 and Reinhart 1997 for other
instances of the same argumentative situation). The possibility of analyzing
part of the data in a De Re fashion is discussed in Section 1.4 below.
(ii) Alternatively, we may posit that the embedded tense is really read De Se,
but that its features are invisible in the interpretive component; or to put it
differently, that the embedded tense inherits the features of the matrix tense in
a purely morphological fashion.
The latter alternative is particularly natural for reasons of symmetry,
but also because there are other cases in which a De Re analysis won't do,
namely those that were originally taken to argue decisively in favor of rules of
purely morphological tense agreement, as in the Kamp & Rohrer example we
cited above:
(20) John decided yesterday that tomorrow he would tell his mother that they
were having their last meal together.
                                                 
10 After I had completed this paper, I learned that O. Percus and U. Sauerland had provided a
full argument for the existence of De Se readings of he (see Percus & Sauerland 2002).  It
would be interesting to try to apply their methods to tense. I leave this for future research.
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 No De Re analysis will save us from positing an agreement rule in this case,
since on a De Re construal the time of the event denoted by the most
embedded verb lies in the speaker's future even though 'were' bears past tense
features. The idea, then, is that both (19) and (20) can be accounted for by one
and the same rule of morphological agreement, which is in effect the temporal
counterpart of the Sequence of Person rule that was posited above.  I now
mention an argument for positing an analogous rule of mood agreement
(Section 1.2), and sketch a unified (and admittedly stipulative) account of
agreement phenomena in attitude reports (Section 1.3). A partial alternative in
terms of a De Re analysis is sketched in Section 1.4.
1.2 The Necessity of Rules of Mood Agreement
Consider the following sentence:
(21) a. She thinks that it is raining.
b. she1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1 be-raining- c1T-indc1W
c. she1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1 be-raining- c1T-c1W
As was the case in our discussion of embedded tense in (17), two analyses
suggest themselves. According to the representation in (17)b, the indicative
features of the embedded clause are interpreted, and thus introduce a certain
presupposition on the value of the term c
1W
.  By contrast, in the representation
given in (21)c the embedded indicative features are assumed to be
semantically invisible, and thus to trigger no presupposition at all.
While the semantic analysis of the indicative is controversial, it would
appear that the representation in  (21)b will systematically lead to incorrect
predictions.
(i) Suppose first that a world-denoting term with indicative features is
presupposed to denote the world of utterance. Then a problem appears
immediately, since for (21)a this leads to the prediction that the world of every
context compatible with the agent's beliefs should be the actual world. Since
this means that the agent must have perfect and complete knowledge of the
world, the analysis is clearly undesirable.
(ii) Suppose now that a more elaborate theory of the indicative is adopted,
along the lines of Stalnaker 1975. In the terms of the present discussion,
Stalnaker essentially assumed that an indicative feature introduces a
presupposition that the world-denoting term on which it appears denotes one
of the worlds compatible with what the speech act participants presuppose
(i.e. one of the worlds in the set {cW: c is compatible with the participants of
c* presuppose at time c*W in world c*W}; this is what Stalnaker calls the
'context set'11). The theory was designed to account for indicative conditionals,
such as 'If John comes, Mary will be happy'. On a common theory of
                                                 
11 The terminology is unfortunate since for us the 'context set' is really a set of possible worlds
(Stalnaker 1968, 1975 was not concerned with the world/context distinction).
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conditionals (developed in Stalnaker 1968), the if-clause denotes the closest
world from the world of utterance in which John comes; and the entire
sentence is true just in case that world, call it w, is one in which Mary is
happy. In this framework the contribution of the indicative mood is to trigger a
presupposition that w is compatible with what the speech act participants
presuppose, and thus that it is possible that John will come.  While such a
theory has desirable consequences for the analysis of conditionals, it leads to
incorrect predictions for (21)b. If we apply once again rules of presupposition
projection in universally quantified structures, we obtain the requirement that
for every context c compatible with the agent's belief, the world of c is
compatible with what the speech act participants presuppose. In other words,
the worlds compatible with the agent's beliefs are presupposed to be also
compatible with the beliefs of the speech act participants. But this is incorrect:
no matter how outlandish the agent's beliefs may appear to the speaker and
hearer, the grammaticality of (21)b will remain unaffected.12
The obvious solution, then, is to suppose that there are purely
morphological rules of agreement in attitude reports, so that the indicative
features of the embedded verb in (21)a are semantically invisible, in line with
the hypothesis in (21)b.
1.3 Analysis
If the foregoing observations are correct, some rules of morphological
agreement are needed to handle  person, tense and mood when these appear in





(the author, time and world coordinates of a context ci) are pronounced with
features that are inherited from an argument of the attitude verb and are not
semantically interpreted. Why such a phenomenon should exist in the first
place is a complete mystery; our attempt will only be to state a stipulation that
accounts for the similarity between person, tense and mood agreement.
The idea we pursue is that the formation rule of attitude operators
requires that the context variables (in our implementation: the
                                                 
12 In principle the same point could also be made about subjunctive conditionals, but the
difficulty is that there is no consensus on how these should be analyzed semantically [one
possible theory is that the subjunctive does not introduce any special semantic constraint, and
that its contribution is purely pragmatic, arising from an implicature that the speaker could not
have marked the conditional as indicative; see von Fintel 1997 for a related theory]. In any
event, it also appears that whatever semantic/pragmatic contribution a subjunctive mood
normally makes disappears when it can be analyzed as the result of agreement with a super-
ordinate attitude verb. Thus a. below presents Mary's act of thinking as possible, while in b.
there is a presumption that it is counterfactual; but there is not corresponding difference
between the way the event of raining is presented in a. and in b. On the present analysis this is
because the modal features of be raining in a. and b. result from a  rule of morphological
agreement with the super-ordinate attitude verb; as a result, these features need not be present
in the interpretive component and thus have no semantic consequences.
(ii) a. If she thinks that it is raining, she will take an umbrella
b. <>If she thought that it was/were  raining, she would take an umbrella
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complementizers) inherit the features of the individual, time and world
arguments of the embedding verb. These features are then pronounced in a
post-syntactic (morphological) component of the grammar (what syntacticians
call 'PF'). A full fragment is developed in the Appendix, but the crucial
definition is given below:
(22) If j is a formula, P is an attitude verb, i is an individual term, t is  a time
term, w is a world term, and k is an integer, then  i P-t-w thatckF j is a
formula, where F is the triple of {e, he, she}¥{e, pres, past}¥{e, ind,
subj} whose first coordinate is he/she if he/she appears in i, and e
otherwise; whose second coordinate is pres/past if pres/past appears in
t, and e otherwise; and whose third coordinate is ind/subj if ind/subj
appears in w, and e otherwise.
The bulk of the morphological work is played by the triple of features F,
which plays no semantic role. In the phonological component, each coordinate
of a context, of the form ciFA , ciFT , ciFW is replaced  with the corresponding
coordinate of F. This is illustrated in the following example, where each
argument (individual, time and world) of the embedded verb is read De Se, i.e.
spells out a coordinate of the embedded context.
(23) a. He hopes that he is elected (De Se Reading for the embedded he)






W, with F=<he, pres,
ind>
c. (b) is pronounced as: he hope-pres-ind that he be-elected-pres-ind
(23)a receives the syntactic analysis in (23)b, which serves both as an 'S-
structure' and as a 'Logical Form'. In the phonological component the sentence





T  and c1
F
W have been replaced with
he, pres  and ind respectively, as is desired. Finally the truth-conditions are the
ones that one would expect: when the sentence does not result in a
presupposition failure (as is for instance the case when the matrix argument
he1 is used with the intention of referring to a female individual), it is true just
in case for every context compatible c with the agent's hope (at the time and
world of the utterance c*), the author of c is elected at the time of c in the
world of c.
Let us observe that something special must be said about future
auxiliaries. For an attitude verb in the future triggers the same agreement
behavior as if it were in the present. In particular, the future tense features are
not morphologically transmitted to the embedded verb, so that for instance
'John will say that he will be elected' does not readily have a reading on which
John's utterance is supposed to be of the form: 'I am elected' (rather, the
sentence is naturally understood as predicting that John will say: 'I will be
elected', which shows that the embedded future tense features are semantically
interpreted). Similarly, an attitude verb preceded by would (analyzed as the
past tense of will, i.e. will-ed) triggers the same agreement as would be found
14
under an attitude verb in the past tense. In order to capture these facts, I posit
that the future is always composed of two parts: will is analyzed as will(pres),
while would is analyzed as will(past)13.  In line with the analysis of tenses as
variables, I assume that both parts of the compound come equipped with their
own referential indices. I further assume that the argument of will (whether it
is pres or past) only has the power to trigger a presupposition failure. For
instance willi(pastk) yields a presupposition failure under an assignment s in a
context c* (i.e. it denotess, c* #) in case s(ti) (so to speak, the denotation of will)
is not after s(tk) (=the denotation of the past tense). But in case no
presupposition failure occurs, the argument of will plays no additional role, so
that for instance willi(pastk) simply denotess, c* s(ti). On the morphological side,
I assume that the features of will never appear on the diacritics of context
variables, but that the features of pres and past do get so transmitted. This
provides an account of Kamp & Rohrer's example, along the following lines:
(24) a. He decided (yesterday) that (tomorrow) he would say (to his mother)
that he was leaving (the embedded past tenses need not be interpreted)















with F=F'=<he, past, ind>
c. (b) is pronounced as: he decide-past-ind  that he  say-fut(past)-ind that
he  be-leaving-past-ind
Each argument of the first embedded verb (say) is a coordinate of the context
variable c1, which bears the diacritic F=<he, past, ind> because the arguments







W are eventually pronounced as he, fut-past (i.e. would) and








W  are then copied onto the diacritic F' of the context
variable c
2
, in accordance with the rule stated in (22).  The rule requires that F'




is, he (since F=<he, past, ind>). Similarly the second coordinate of F' should
include the tense features of fut2(c1
F
T), excluding fut (which does not enter in
agreement phenomena); this simply yields past. And by the same token the
third coordinate of F' should be ind, so that in the end F'=<he, past, ind> ends
up being identical to F. c
2
F'  can then trigger the correct agreement patterns on
the individual, time and world arguments of the most deeply embedded verb,
                                                 
13 By no means does this suffice to account for the full behavior of the future. One basic
phenomenon which is left out of the present discussion is the ability of a future operator to
shift the point of evaluation of a present tense which is in its scope, as in the following
example:
(iii) John will meet a man who is holding a copy of L&P in his hand (Ogihara 1996 p. 161)
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which are all coordinates of c
2
F', and are thus pronounced as he, past and ind
respectively.
1.4 An alternative without person and mood agreement but with (some)
tense agreement
One major drawback of this system is that it relies on agreement rules that are
entirely ad hoc. Its major virtue is that the agreement rules are uniform across
referential domains, in the sense that a single rule takes care of person, tense
and mood agreement all at once. One way to improve on this system would be
to motivate the rule in question, for instance by showing that it falls under a
broader system of agreement between a variable and its binder. This has been
attempted in Heim 2002, although many stipulations are admittedly needed to
make attitude verbs fall in line with generalized quantifiers14.
An alternative would be to deny that an agreement rule is necessary to
begin with. The suggestion builds on the observation that a De Se reading
entails the corresponding De Re reading; in other words, if it is true that John
hopes to be elected, it is also true that John hopes, of John, that he will be
elected.  As a result, a De Se reading can be analyzed as a De Re reading that
has certain additional requirements. In this fashion we can do without
agreement in most, though not in all cases. A tense agreement rule remains
necessary to account for Kamp & Rohrer's example, as was pointed out above.
Let us first consider the issue of Quantifying In independently of the De
Se problem. The initial observation, due to Quine 1956, was that both of the
following sentences may simultaneously be true:
(25) a. Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy (qua the man Ralph saw at
the cocktail party)
b. Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is not a spy (qua the man Ralph
saw at the beach).
On the assumption that beliefs are closed under conjunction, the simplest
analysis would risk attributing irrationality to Ralph. For instance if we
analyze (25)a as asserting that every world (resp. every context) compatible
with Ralph's belief is one in which Ortcutt is a spy, by parity of reasoning we
will also have to analyze (25)b as asserting that every world (resp. every
context) compatible with Ralph's belief is one in which Ortcutt is not a spy.
Since there are no worlds in which Ortcutt both is and isn't a spy, there should
be no worlds at all (resp. no contexts at all) compatible with Ralph's beliefs,
which should make him irrational.  This fails to distinguish irrationality from
cases of mistaken identity. Kaplan’s solution in ‘Quantifying In’ was to
                                                 
14 Heim's observation was that in, say, [Only I] lx x did myx homework, the first person
possessive pronoun myx  must be allowed to range over non-speakers. This suggests that its
features are the result of agreement with the generalized quantifier [Only I], which is itself
presumed to inherit the features of I. Heim's attempt is to re-analyze the syntax of attitude
verbs in order to make them fall under the same kind of agreement rules. I refer the reader to
Heim 2002 for details.
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reintroduce in his truth-conditions the mode of presentation under which
Ralph held the relevant beliefs.  According to Kaplan, what is asserted by
(25)a is that for some 'vivid' description a which in fact picks out Ortcutt,
Ralph believes (De Dicto): a is a spy (for instance a may be the description
the man I saw at the cocktail party). This doesn't exclude that for some other
description a' that also denotes Ortcutt (e.g. the man I saw at the beach) Ralph
may believe: a' is not a spy. As long as a and a' are different, no irrationality
need be attributed to Ralph, just as we desired.
Crucially, not any description that happens to pick out Ortcutt will
count as 'vivid'. For instance Ralph would certainly assent to: 'The shortest spy
is a spy'; and it might well be that (unbeknownst to Ralph) the description 'the
shortest spy' does in fact pick out Ortcutt. Still, one wouldn't say in this
situation that 'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy'. Somehow for the De Re
reading to be true Ralph must bear some direct connection to Ortcutt. This is
what motivates Kaplan 1969 to add the restriction that the description should
be 'vivid'. How 'vivid' should be defined is an open question; but it is clear that
some restriction of this kind is needed for De Re readings of individual-
denoting terms. As will become clear later, an analogous restriction is
necessary in the analysis De Re readings of time- and world-denoting terms,
as one would expect.
 Abusch 1997 adopts a variant of Kaplan's theory in which there is no
existential quantification over vivid descriptions. Rather, she assumes that the
relevant (vivid) description is contextually given. One motivation for doing so
is that (25)a and (25)b cannot both be asserted in a given context. Arguably,
'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, and he also believes that Orctutt is not a
spy' sounds like a near-contradiction, contrary to what Kaplan would predict.
Abusch's variant can explain this on the assumption that only one 'vivid'
description of Ortcutt can be salient in a given context. (25)a and (25)b can
still both be true, but they cannot both be asserted felicitously in the same
context. Without taking a principled stance on this issue, I adopt this modified
version of Kaplan's analysis, mainly because it simplifies the formal
development of the system.
At this point any theory is bound to make somewhat stipulative
assumptions to derive the correct truth-conditions. On the approach pursued in
Abusch 1997 and Heim 1994b, the De Re term is moved outside of the
embedded clause by an operation of covert movement. There is no syntactic
evidence for such an operation, which would have to violate standard island
constraints on movement15. On the other hand it allows the semantics to
                                                 
15 Consider the following:
(iv) [Talking to Ortcutt] Ralph believes that if you are a spy, you must have caused a lot of
trouble.
Here you must be quantified in.  On the movement approaches mentioned above, you would
have to be raised out of the if-clause to become an argument of believe. This is not a
satisfactory analysis, since it is known that if-clauses are islands to movement.
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operate relatively smoothly, in a compositional fashion. Here I have adopted a
different method, which is to stipulate that each free variable ranging over
objects of sort S in the scope of an attitude operator is  replaced with a
variable over functions from contexts to objects of sort S (i.e. descriptions of
objects of sort S), indexed with the closest c-commanding context variable:
(26) If k is the index of a free variable in the immediate scope of an attitude
verb introducing a variable c
i
F, replace k with k*, i.
For example, a variable x2 in the immediate scope of an attitude verb
introducing a variable c
1
F is replaced with the expression  x2*, 1. Its value under
an assignment s is s(x2*), a function from contexts to individuals, applied to
s(c1).  This yields the individual named or described by s(x2*) in the context
s(c1), as is desired. (In Quine's example, s(x2*) might be the value of the
description 'the man I saw at the beach', or of 'the man I saw at the cocktail
party'). Here is an illustration:
(27) a. He thought that she was pregnant (De Re for the embedded she, De Se
for the embedded past tense)












d. When (c) is not weirds, c*, (c) is true s, c* iff for every context c' in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , s(x2*)(c') is pregnant at the time c'T in the world c'W.
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-was-ind
(27)b is the formula generated by the initial version of the system, without De
Re transformation. (27)c is the output of the De Re transformation, which only
affects the pronoun she2, transformed into she2*,1 , which could have been
written less concisely as she2*(c1
F). The pronunciation is, of course, as in the
old system. As for the truth-conditions, they are given in simplified form in
(27)d, where the various possible sources of presupposition failure have been
omitted.
This system can then be modified to account for De Se readings, treated
as a species of De Re readings in which the only acceptable descriptions are I
(for individuals), now (for times) and actually (for worlds). In Appendix C this
idea is implemented by optionally substituting '+' to '*' after the De Re
Transformation, with the convention that in such cases the corresponding
description is presupposed to be restricted to the value of I, now or actually
(i.e. lc cA, lc cT or lc cW). One example (developed in Appendix C) is given in
simplified form in (28), where each of the embedded arguments is read De Re
and De Se. The important observation is that this is achieved without recourse







W, which were used above to derive De Se
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readings; and that therefore the diacritic F plays no role in deriving the correct
pronunciation.
(28) a. He hopes that he is elected  / He hopes that he himself is elected / He
hopes to be elected (De Se Reading for each of the embedded
arguments)
b. he1 think-pres1-ind1 thatc1F he1 be-elected-pres1-ind1, with F=<he, pres,
ind>
c. he1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1F he1+, 1 be-elected-pres1+, 1-ind1+, 1, with
F=<he, past, ind>
d. When (c) is not weirds, c*, (c) is true s, c* iff for every context c' in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , s(x1+)(c') is elected at time s(t1+)(c') in world
s(w1+)(c'),  i.e. c'A is elected at time c'T in world c'W.
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that he be-elected-pres-ind
This system can be extended to tense and mood (see Appendix C).
However it cannot account for Kamp & Rohrer's example, since there is no
sense in which the tense of the most deeply embedded verb (was leaving) can
be interpreted as being De Re with respect to any past moment. For this
example we are thus forced to posit a Sequence of Tense rule, one that does
not appear to have any counterpart in the person or in the mood domain. Thus
it is unclear that any net gain is obtained by giving a De Re treatment of De Se
readings; although the need for a mechanism of morphological agreement is
obviated in some cases, some stipulations remain necessary for the original
Sequence of Tense cases.
2  Double Access Readings with Tense and Mood: the Generalized
Upper Limit Constraint
If the approach developed in Sections 1.1-1.3 is on the right track, the
phenomenon of Sequence of Tense in English should be analyzed as one
instance of a more general agreement mechanism that affects in the same
fashion person, tense and mood. There is, however, another phenomenon that
has been taken to target specifically tense in attitude reports: the existence of
so-called 'Double Access Readings'. In this section I suggest that the
equivalent of Double Access Readings exists with mood, and I try to
generalize the theory of Abusch 1997 to account for this phenomenon. As was
the case in Section 1, the goal is not to derive the facts from first principles,
but only to show that some stipulations that have been taken to apply
specifically to tense can be stated in a slightly more general fashion so as to
account for similar phenomena in the domain of mood. (Person is left out of
the present discussion, since to my knowledge it does not display the
equivalent of Double Access Readings).
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2.1 The Generalization
The initial observation concerning tense is summarized in the following
paradigm:
(29) a. #He already thought ten years ago that she is pregnant16.
b. He already thought ten days ago that she is pregnant.
a'. He already thought ten years ago that she would (now) be pregnant.
b'. He already thought ten days ago that she would (now) be pregnant.
a". He thought ten years ago that she was pregnant.
b". He thought ten days ago that she was pregnant.
Unsurprisingly, (29)a" and (29)b" attribute to the agent a thought about the
time of his thought act (or according to the De Se analysis sketched above,
about the time that he thinks is the time of his thought act); just as unsurprising
are (29)a' and (29)b', which (with the adverb now) attribute to the agent a
thought about the time of utterance. On the other hand the contrast between
(29)a and (29)b is surprising. Abusch 1997 suggests that in this case the
present tense serves to attribute to the agent a thought about an interval that
includes both the time (that he thinks is the time) of his thought act and the
time of utterance (see also Ogihara 2000 for a somewhat different analysis).
Surprising though it is, this description accounts for the contrast between (29)a
and (29)b, since it would seem that it is difficult for anyone to think that a
pregnancy could span an interval of ten years. The point can be made more
sharply by considering embeddings under attitude verbs that are factive, and
thus force the embedded clause to be true:
(30) a. #He learned ten years ago that she is pregnant.
b. He learned ten days ago that she is pregnant.
In (30)a the speaker must presuppose that the pregnancy actually spanned ten
years, hence the deviance of the sentence given standard assumptions.
The suggestion we wish to pursue is that Double Access Readings also
exist under structurally similar conditions in the domain of mood. In such
cases the attitude holder must have a thought that is both about the world of
the speaker and the world (that he thinks is the world of) his thought act.
Particularly striking (though not necessarily robust) is the effect found with
factive attitude verbs embedded in the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional:
(31) a. If John learned that Mary was/were (now) pregnant, he would be
devastated.
b. If John learned that Mary is (now) pregnant, he would be devastated.
For some speakers (31)b presupposes that Mary is actually pregnant, while no
such presupposition holds in (31)a. Furthermore in (31)b the presupposition is
                                                 
16 As J. Lecarme (p.c.) observes, the sentence becomes acceptable if I report a male
individual's thoughts about Mona Lisa. Of course this only confirms the generalization we
develop below: thanks to Leonardo, if Mona Lisa is pregnant, she is pregnant in all eternity.
And hence her pregnancy does span more than 9 months...
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that Mary is pregnant both in the actual world and in the world picked out by
the if-clause. Similar facts appear to hold of the French sentences in (32),
where the present/past morphology in the antecedent of the conditional is
interpreted in a purely modal fashion (both sentences are understood to be
about the time of utterance):
(32) a. Si d'aventure Jean apprenait que Marie était enceinte, il serait désespéré.
If by adventure Jean learned that Marie was pregnant, he would-be devastated
'If Jean ever learned that Marie was pregnant, he would be devastated'
b. Si d'aventure Jean apprenait que Marie est enceinte, il serait déspespéré.
If by adventure Jean learned that Marie is pregnant, he would-be devastated
'If Jean ever learned that Marie is pregnant, he would be devastated'.
(32)a only presupposes that Marie is  pregnant in the world picked out by the
if-clause, so to speak. By contrast (32)b presupposes both that Marie is
pregnant in the actual world and in the world picked out by the if-clause.   The
same effect can to some extent be replicated with a morphological subjunctive
in French:
(33) a. Je crains qu'un jour Jean rentre chez lui et qu'il apprenne que
I fear that one day Jean comes-back home and that he  learn-subj that
Marie  soit enceinte.
Marie is-subj. pregnant
b. Je crains qu'un jour Jean rentre chez lui et qu'il apprenne que
I fear that one day Jean comes-back home and that he learn-subj that
Marie est enceinte.
 Marie is-ind. pregnant
There appears to be a preference for interpreting (33)b with a presupposition
that Marie is pregnant both in the actual world and in the worlds compatible
with what I fear. By contrast (33)a only requires that Marie be pregnant in the
worlds compatible with what I fear.
Although these facts are suggestive, they are not entirely robust, and
they are also difficult to analyze because of their interaction with the complex
issue of presupposition projection in subjunctive conditionals (see for instance
Heim 1992 for a treatment). We henceforth concentrate on non-factive attitude
verbs, whose behavior is illustrated by the following paradigm:
(34) Situation: It is raining outside.
a. Si Jean pensait qu'il fait beau, il serait fou.
If Jean thought that it did beautiful, he would be crazy
'If Jean thought that the weather was nice, he would be crazy'
b. #Si Jean pensait qu'il faisait beau, il serait fou.
   If Jean thought that it does beautiful, he would be crazy
'If Jean thought that the weather was nice, he would be crazy'
c. Si Jean pensait qu'il faisait beau, il se mettrait en short
   If Jean thought that it does beautiful, he SE would-put in shorts
'If Jean thought that the weather was nice, he would put on his shorts'
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Given a situation where both the speaker and the hearer know that is raining,
the sentence in (34)a appears to be true. This can be explained in the following
way: the if-clause picks out a world w in which Jean thinks, of w and of the
actual world c*W, that they are worlds in which the weather is nice. This
thought is not reasonable in view of the evidence available to the speaker and
hearer. By contrast, it is hard to make sense of the sentence in (34)b, where
Jean's thought in the counterfactual world w is only about w, not about the
world of utterance c*W.  Presumably the closest world from c*W in which Jean
thinks that the weather is nice need not be a world in which it is raining (as is
the case in the actual world), unless Jean is assumed to be systematically
misguided in his judgments. Hence (34)b does not sound true or even
coherent. As is expected, the incoherence stems from this particular choice of
consequence clause; as soon as the latter is modified, as in (34)c, coherence is
regained. Similar facts  can be replicated in English, although my informant
preferred 'claim' to 'think' (again every verb is interpreted as being about the
time of utterance; for reasons that I do not understand my informant preferred
'was nice' to 'were nice' in (35)a, and found it helpful to have 'were to claim'
rather than 'claim' in the antecedent):
(35) Situation: It is raining outside.
a. If John were to claim that the weather is nice, he would be crazy
b. ??If John were to claim that the weather was nice, he would be crazy
c. <If John were to claim that the weather was nice, Peter would
immediately put on his shorts>
In the preceding example the 'counterfactual' mood of the conditional
is morphologically expressed with a past tense (imperfect), something which
is common  across languages (see Iatridou 2000). Lest the reader think that the
phenomenon of Double Access Readings is somehow related to tense
morphology, I also give a French example in which this is clearly not so (I
note, however, that some French speakers appear not accept mood agreement
under the subjunctive; for those speakers (36)b is ungrammatical):
(36) Situation: It is raining outside.
a. Il faudrait que Jean prétende qu'il fait beau.
 It would-be-necessary that Jean claim-subj. that it does-ind. beautiful
'Jean should claim that the weather is nice'
b. Il faudrait que Jean prétende qu'il fasse beau.
It would-be-necessary that Jean claim-subj. that it does-subj. beautiful
'Jean should claim that the weather was nice'
In (36)a the speaker presents as desirable a situation in which Jean makes a
particularly implausible claim, one that entails that the weather in the actual
world is in fact nice. No such inference can be drawn from (36)b, even in the
situation as described. In other words, the presence of the indicative in the
embedded clause triggers an interpretation on which Jean's claim is both about
22
the actual world and about the world of his utterance, as is expected on the
present analysis.
2.2 Extending Abusch's Account: the Generalized Upper Limit
Constraint
We now extend to mood the theory of Double Access Readings developed in
Abusch 1997. Abusch's analysis of tense is first restated within the present
framework, and it is then extended to mood.
2.2.1 A restatement of Abusch's analysis of Double Access Readings
One of the important insights in Abusch 1997 was that the existence of Double
Access Readings is related to another peculiarity of tense, the unavailability of
Forward Shifted Readings in the absence of a future tense morpheme in the
embedded clause, as shown below:
(37) a. #He thought in 1990 that she was pregnant in 2000.
b. He thought in 1990  that she would be pregnant in 2000.
Following Abusch 1997, the generalization appears to be that the time
coordinate of a context variable c is an 'upper limit' for the denotation of all
time terms which are in its immediate scope, in the sense that these may not
denote an interval which is entirely after the time of c. Within the framework
we develop in the Appendix, we stipulate that a presupposition failure occurs
if a time description denotes an interval which is entirely after the denotation
of the time coordinate of the closest c-commanding context. The relevant part
of the statement is given in (38); it has the effect of preventing time
descriptions that correspond to a present or past tense from denoting an
interval that lies entirely after the time of the local context:
(38) tk*,i  denotess, c* # iff ...(iii) [tŒ{pres, past} and s(tk*)(s(ci)) is entirely
after (s(ci))T] ...
For instance, pastk*,i will denote #, i.e. trigger a presupposition failure, if the
salient description of times tk* fails to denote (in the context s(ci)) an interval
that lies entirely after the time of s(ci) (remember that given our conventions
the second index of pastk*,i is the index of the local context variable).
Independently of these unexciting details of implementation, the
important observation made by Abusch was that this stipulation (mainly
motivated by the unavailability of Forward Shifted Readings) suffices to
account for Double Access Readings. Why? Because the Upper Limit
Constraint authorizes a time description embedded under a context variable c
to denote an interval T that reaches beyond the time of c, but only if  T also
includes the time of c - hence the 'Double Access' effect, which attributes to
the agent a thought about an interval that has two anchors, so to speak.
Let us see in greater detail how this works. Here is a representative
example:
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(39) a. He thought that she is pregnant  








d. (c) is weirds, c* iff ... for some c' in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> ...
 (i') s(t2) is not c*T, or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to <s(x1),
s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(t2*) isn't vivid for c or s(t2) is not a part of s(t2*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(t2*)(c') is entirely after c'T  ...
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-pres-ind
 (39)c is the result obtained after the De Re Transformation, which replaced
the time variable pres2  with the time description pres2*, 1, whose context
argument is c
1
 (as is indicated by the second subscript of pres2*, 1). Some of the
failure conditions are given in (39)d, where it is seen that in the context of the
agent's thought act (which we call c) s(t2*) must denote an interval that
includes s(t2), i.e. (by (i')) the time of utterance c*T. But it is also the case that
for each context c' compatible with the agent's thought, s(t2*)(c') should not be
entirely after c'T (by (iii')). Hence if the agent is not mistaken about the time,
his thought will have to be about an interval that includes both the time of the
speaker's utterance and the time of the agent's thought act, as is desired.
2.2.2 Extension to Mood
The logic of this argument can be extended to mood by stating for the
indicative a stipulation that is roughly the world analogue of the Upper Limit
Constraint. The idea is that a world term in the immediate scope of a context
variable ci must denote, among others, the world of the denotation of ci.  Thus
the constraint in  (38) is extended by adding the following clause:
(40) wk*,i  denotess, c* # iff  ... (iii)... [wŒ{ind} and (s(ci))W isn't a part of
s(wk*)(s(ci))] ...17
Let us see an application right away. In order to avoid the issue of
presupposition projection in subjunctive conditionals, I consider an example in
which an indicative verb is embedded under a subjunctive attitude verb which
is itself embedded under 'il faut que' ('it is necessary that'), which triggers the
subjunctive. As before I only include the most important part of the failure
conditions (a full derivation is given in Appendix B):
(41) a. (Il faut qu') il pense qu'elle est enceinte
(It is necessary that) he think-subj that she is-ind pregnant
                                                 
17 The rule stated in Appendix B looks more abstract because it encompasses both (38) and
(40).
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b. he1 think-pres1-subj1 thatc1F  she2 be-pregnant-c1
F
T-ind2,  with F=<he,
pres, subj>
c. he1 think-pres1-subj1 thatc1F  she2*, 1 be-pregnant-c1
F
T- ind2*, 1, with
F=<he, pres, subj>
d. (c) is weirds, c* iff ... for some c' in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> ...
 (i') s(w2) is not c*W, or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(w2*) isn't vivid for c or s(w2) is not a part of
s(w2*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(w2*)(c') does not contain c'W ...
e. Pronunciation: he think-pres-subj that  she be-pregnant-pres-ind
After the De Re Transformation, the world variable ind2 is replaced with ind2*,
1, which denotes a world description whose argument is the variable c1, as
indicated by the second subscript of ind2*, 1. In order to avoid a presupposition
failure, w2* must denote in the context of the agent's speech act c a group of
worlds that includes s(w2) (by (ii')), hence  c*W, the world of the actual context
(since by (i') a presupposition failure ensues if s(w2)≠c*W). Moreover, by (iii'),
for each context c' compatible with the agent's thought, s(w2*)(c') must also
include c'W. The latter is the contribution made by the Generalized Upper
Limit Constraint.
Let us make things more concrete. Suppose the agent of the attitude is
John, who is thinking about Mary; and assume that the salient description d is:
the worlds in which Mary has the same symptoms as she in fact does, or
(equivalently) the worlds in which Mary has these symptoms, pointing to
Mary's current condition [the semantic value of this description is: lc the
worlds w such that Mary has the same symptoms in w as in cW]. Does d satisfy
the presuppositions of (41)? Let us assume that (i') is satisfied.  (iii'), which is
the contribution of the Generalized Upper Limit Constraint, requires that for
every context c' compatible with what John thinks in the actual world c*W at
the time of utterance c*T, d uttered in c' should denote a group of worlds that
includes c'W; this is trivially the case since Mary certainly has the same
symptoms in c'W as she does in... c'W. Thus due to the indexical nature of the
description ('the same symptoms as she does in the actual world'), the
Generalized Upper Limit Constraint is automatically satisfied. Condition (ii')
requires that the description d, uttered in the counterfactual world s(w1),
should denote a group that includes the actual world c*W. In other words, it
should be presupposed that Mary has the same symptoms in s(w1) as in the
actual world. To put it more generally, Condition (ii') forces the counterfactual
worlds that are 'talked about' in (41)a to share some salient property P with the
actual world, where P represents a natural way in which the agent of the
attitude (in the counterfactual world) would characterize the world he thinks
he lives in. Speakers' intuitions are certainly not sharp enough to validate this
prediction, especially since everything depends on the choice of the
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description d, for which there is no independent evidence. However it does
seem to be presupposed in (41)a that the counterfactual situations that are
talked about (=the situations compatible with what the speaker deems
desirable) somehow share some salient property with the actual world. No
such impression would hold if the embedded indicative were replaced with a
subjunctive: Il faut qu'il pense qu'elle soit enceinte. The present theory can
analyze this contrast as a consequence of Condition (ii').
Let us now see what would go wrong if we didn't have Condition (ii')
or Condition (iii') (for simplicity I am assuming that there is a context that
corresponds to <s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>). Without the requirement that s(w2) (i.e.
c*W) be a part of s(w 2*)(c), there would be no sense in which the agent's
thought has be about the actual world. Without the vividness condition, any
kind of description would be allowed, for instance: the worlds in which Mary
is pregnant. Now there is no doubt that John would assent to: 'Mary is
pregnant in the worlds in which Mary is pregnant'. But this shouldn't be
enough to attribute to John a thought about the actual world, even if the actual
world is one in which Mary is in fact pregnant. Something more must be
required of the description. In the above example (the worlds in which Mary
has these symptoms [pointing]), we can assume that the vividness requirement
is satisfied by the fact that a term of direct reference is used in the definition of
the description. But this is not even the beginning of a theory of what 'vivid'
means when applied to a description of worlds. All the present argument
shows is that some constraint of this form is needed if the theory is to get off
the ground. This is of course unsurprising since we saw that, in the case of De
Re readings of individual terms, such a constraint is also needed (see Kaplan
1969 for an attempt to spell out a theory of vividness for descriptions of
individuals).
Without Condition (iii'), we would allow the salient description to be
one that, according to John, does not pick out the world that he thinks he lives
in. For instance the description could be: the closest world in which Mary has
a big belly [whose semantic value is: lc the closest worlds from cW in which
Mary has a big belly].  If so the thought attributed to John could very well be
a conditional, for instance: If Mary had a big belly, she would be pregnant18.
But here intuitions are, I believe, very sharp: (41)a entails that in the worlds
compatible with what the speaker deems desirable, John would assent to
something of the form 'Mary is pregnant', not to a merely conditional thought
such as 'If she had a big belly, etc.'. The desired entailment would disappear if
Condition (iii') were done away with.  I conclude that the Generalized Upper
Limit Constraint is both necessary and (almost) sufficient to account for the
modal analogues of Double Access Readings, at least when it is embedded in
a theory of De Re attitudes about possible worlds.
                                                 
18 Of course Condition (ii') would still require that in the counterfactual context in which John
is thinking the description the closest world in which Mary has a big belly should in fact pick
out the actual world c*W
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Appendix.  Fragments
A. A Fragment with Quantification Over Contexts and Rules of Agreement
for Person, Tense and Mood
® Definitions
• Vocabulary and Syntax
q Terms and Predicates
Terms
(i) Bare variables: xk (individuals), tk (times), wk (worlds), ckF  (contexts) for
each kŒ|N  and each element F of {e, he, she}¥{e, pres, past}¥{e, ind, subj}
(ii) Simple pronominal variables: hek, shek, (pronouns),  presk, pastk  (tenses),
indk, subjk  (moods), for each kŒ|N
(iii) Coordinates of contexts: cA (individuals), cT (times), cW (worlds), for each
context variable c.
(iv) Complex pronominal variables: If t is a time term formed by (i)-(iii),
futk(t) is a complex tense.
Predicates
-Simple predicates with 1 individual argument, 1 time argument and 1 world
argument: be-elected, be leaving, be pregnant
-Attitude verbs: hope, think, decide, say...
q Formulas
If i is an individual term, t is  a time term and w is a world term, and if P is a
simple predicate, then i P-t-w is a formula.
Note: In a more common logical syntax, i P-t-w would be written as: P(i, t,
w)
If j and y are formulas, then (j & y), (j v y) and ÿj are formulas
If j is a formula, P is an attitude verb, i is an individual term, t is  a time term,
w is a world term, and k is an integer, then  i P-t-w thatckF j is a formula,
where F is the triple of {e, he, she}¥{e, pres, past}¥{e, ind, subj} whose first
coordinate is he/she if he/she appears in i, and e otherwise; whose second
coordinate is pres/past if pres/past appears in t, and e otherwise; and whose
third coordinate is ind/subj if ind/subj appears in w, and e otherwise.
Notes:
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A. By appear in i (resp. appear in t, appear in w) is meant: appear anywhere








W). This will be crucial in example (iv).
B. We will say that j  is in the scope of i P-t-w thatckF
C. F does not play any semantic role but serves to keep track of the features
that must pronounced in the phonological component as a result of the rules of
person, tense and mood agreement. Note that the future morpheme fut never
appears in F (because the future morpheme does not trigger any agreement
phenomena).
• Denotation and Truth
An assignment function s is a function that assigns to each variable xk an
individual,  to each variable tk a moment, to each variable wk a world and to
each variable ck  a context. If x is a variable and d is an object that can be a
value of x, s[xÆd] is the assignment defined by: (i) for each variable z
different from x, s[xÆd] (z)=s(z), and (ii) s[xÆd] (x)=d
Assumptions:
(i) Each context c has exactly one agent cA, one time of occurrence cT and one
world of occurrence cW.
(ii) For each attitude verb P and each triple of the form <i, t, w>, either (a)
there is no attitude of P-ing at t in w by i, or else (b) there is a (possibly
empty) set P<i, t, w> which is the set of contexts compatible with i's attitude of P-
ing at t in w.
Let c* be the context of utterance, let k be any integer and let s be an
assignment function. Then:
q Denotation
xk  denotess, c* s(xk)
tk  denotess, c* s(tk)
wk  denotess, c* s(wk)
ckF  denotess, c* s(ck)  for each FŒ{he, she}¥{pres, past}¥{ind, subj}
ckFA denotess, c* the agent of s(ck) for each FŒ{he, she}¥{pres, past}¥{ind,
subj}
ckFT denotess, c* the time of s(ck) for each FŒ{he, she}¥{pres, past}¥{ind, subj}
ckFW  denotess, c* the world of s(ck) for each FŒ{he, she}¥{pres, past}¥{ind,
subj}
hek denotess, c*  # iff s(xk) isn't a male at the time of c* in the world of c*.
Otherwise it denotess, c* s(xk)
shek denotess, c* # iff s(xk) isn't a female at the time of c* in the world of c*.
Otherwise it denotess, c* s(xk)
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presk denotess, c* # iff s(tk) isn't the time of c*. Otherwise it denotes s, c* s(tk)
pastk denotess, c* # iff s(tk) isn't before the time of c*. Otherwise it denotes s, c*
s(tk)
indk denotess, c* # iff s(wk) isn't c*w. Otherwise it denotess, c* s(wk).
subjk denotess, c* s(wk)
Note: This is an extremely crude analysis of mood, but it will suffice for our
purposes. In a more elaborate treatment, one could use Stalnaker's (1975)
notion of Common Ground to give a definition in which indk denotess, c* # iff
s(wk) isn't in {cw: c is compatible with what c*A believes at c*T in c*W}. The
analysis of the subjunctive would also have to be refined (in the present
account, the subjunctive introduces no presupposition at all).
futk(t) denotess, c* # iff t denotess, c* # or t denotess, c* some moment t and s(tk)
isn't after t. Otherwise futk(t) denotess, c* s(tk)
q Truth
-If j is an atomic formula i P-t-w, where P is a simple predicate,  j is weirds, c*
iff at least one of its arguments denotess, c* #. Otherwise it is trues, c*  iff <i, t,
w> satisfies P, where i, t, w are the denotations s, c* of i, t, w respectively.
-If j is a formula ÿy, j is weirds, c* iff y  is weirds, c*. Otherwise j is trues, c* iff
y  is not trues, c*
-If j is a formula (c & y) (resp. (c v y)), j is weirds, c*  iff c is weirds, c* or y
is weirds, c*. Otherwise j is trues, c* iff c is trues, c* and y  is trues, c*  (resp. c is
trues, c* or y  is trues, c*).
-If j is a formula i P-t-w thatckF y, where P is an attitude verb,  j is weirds, c*
iff (i) i, t or w (or several of them) denotess, c*  # or (ii) i, t or w denotes, c*
respectively an individual i, a time t and a world w and there is an attitude of
P-ing at t in w by i, and for some context c in P <i, t, w>, y is weird s[ckÆc],  c* .
Otherwise, j is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of P-ing by i at t in w19, and for
every context c in P<i, t, w>, y is trues[ckÆc],  c*
• Agreement and Pronunciation
A formula is pronounced by: (i) erasing all numbers, (ii) replacing each
occurrence of cFA with the first coordinate of F, cFT with the second coordinate
of F, and cFW  with the third coordinate of F, for each F Œ{he, she}¥{pres,
past}¥{ind, subj} and (iii) eliminating all remaining context variables.
                                                 




(i) a. He hopes that he is elected  / He hopes that he himself is elected / He
hopes to be elected (De Se Reading for the embedded pronoun)






W, with F=<he, pres,
ind>
c. (b) is weirds, c*   iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not c*T or
s(w1) is not c*W. Otherwise (b) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of hoping
by s(x1) at c*T in c*W and for every context c in hope<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <cA,
cT, cW> satisfies be-elected.
d. (b) is pronounced as: he hope-pres-ind  that he be-elected-pres-ind
Note: Even if some contexts compatible with s(x1)'s hope at c*T in c*W are
contexts whose agent is a woman, the sentence is predicted to be grammatical
since the features of the embedded pronoun he are present in the pronunciation
only.
(ii) a. He hopes that he is elected (De Re Reading for the embedded he)




W, with F=<he, pres,
ind>
c. (b) is weirds, c*   iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not c*T or
s(w1) is not c*W. Otherwise (b) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of hoping
by s(x1) at c*T in c*W and for every context c in hope<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x1),
cT, cW> satisfies be-elected.
d. (b) is pronounced as: he hope-pres-ind  that he be-elected-pres-ind
(iii) a. She thought that he (e.g. Clinton) was president (De Se Reading for
the embedded tense)






c. (b) is weirds, c*   iff s(x1) is not female at c*T in c*W or s(x2) is not male
at c*T in c*W or s(t1) does not precede c*T or s(w1) is not c*W. Otherwise
(b) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at c*T in c*W and
for every context c in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>, <s(x2), cT, cW> satisfies be-
president.
d. (b) is pronounced as: she think-past-ind  that he be-president-past-ind
Note: Even if for some context c compatible with s(x1)'s hope at time s(t1) in
c*W, cT is not before c*T, the sentence is predicted to be grammatical since the
features of the embedded past tense are present in the pronunciation only.
(iv) a. He decided (yesterday) that (tomorrow) he would say (to his mother)
that he was leaving (the embedded past tenses need not be interpreted)
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with F=F'=<he, past, ind>
c. (b) is weirds, c*   iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) does not
precede c*T  or s(w1) is not c*W or (if none of the three preceding
conditions holds) there is an attitude of deciding by s(x1) at s(t1) in c*W
and for some context c in decide<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> s(t2) does not follow cT.
Otherwise (b) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of deciding by s(x1) at s(t1)
in c*W and for every context c in decide<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>, there is an attitude
of saying by cA at s(t2) in cW and for every context c' in say<cA, s(t2), cW>
<c'A, c'T, c'W> satisfies be-leaving.
d. (b) is pronounced as: he decide-past-ind  that he  say-fut(past)-ind that
he  be-leaving-past-ind
(v) a. She thinks that he is president (the embedded mood need not be
interpreted)






c. (b) is weirds, c*   iff s(x1) is not female at c*T in c*W or s(x2) is not male
at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not the time of c* or s(w1) is not in c*W.
Otherwise (b) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in c*W and for every context c in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>, <s(x2), cT, cW>
satisfies be-president.
d. (b) is pronounced as: she think-pres-ind  that he be-president-pres-ind
Note: Even if (as is extremely likely) for some context c in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>
cW≠c*W, the sentence is still predicted to be grammatical since the features of
the embedded mood are present in the pronunciation only.
B. Adding Kaplan's Analysis of Quantifying In and a Generalized Upper
Limit Constraint
® Definitions
• Vocabulary and Syntax
q Terms and Predicates
Same as A., but replace (ii) with (ii') and (iv) with (iv'):
(ii') Simple pronominal variables: same as (ii), adding hek*, i shek*, i
(pronouns),  presk*, i, pastk*, i  (tenses), indk*, i subjk*, i (moods), for each k, i
Œ|N
(iv') Complex pronominal variables: If t is a time term formed by (i)-(ii')-(iii),
futk(t) and futk*, i(t) are complex tenses.
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q Formulas
The well-formed formulas are those of A, modified by the following
transformation:
De Re Transformation: If k is the index of a free variable in the immediate
scope of an attitude verb introducing a variable c
i
F, replace k with k*, i.
Note: By free variable is meant: any free variable (i.e. a bare variable, a
simple pronominal variable, or a  complex pronominal variable). By variable v
is in the immediate scope of the attitude verb  A is meant: v is in the scope of A
and there is no other attitude verb A' which is in the scope of A and such that v
is in the scope of A'.
• Denotation and Truth
An assignment function s is a function that assigns to each variable xk a
singular individual,  to each variable tk a singular moment, to each variable wk
a singular world, to each variable ck a context, to each variable xk* a function
from contexts to (singular or plural) individuals, to each variable tk* a function
from contexts to time intervals, and to each variable wk* a function from
contexts to groups (=pluralities) of worlds.
Terminology: For individuals, times and worlds we adopt a mereology with a
part-of relation. For times only intervals and singular moments are considered
(in other words, the only plural moments are intervals). Correspondingly,
predicates are taken to be satisfied by singular or plural objects.
q Denotation
Let i P-t-w thatciF   be the attitude verb in the immediate scope of which the
following terms appear. Let i, t, w be the denotationss, c* of  i, t, w respectively.
Then for each aŒ{he,  she,  pres,  past,  ind},  for each time term t, and for
each k, iŒ|N, the following holds, where a is 'x' if aŒ{he,  she}, 't' if aŒ{pres,
past} and 'w' if aŒ{ind}:
ak*,i  denotess, c* # iff (i) ak denotess, c* #, or
(ii) there is a context c corresponding to <i, t, w> and
[s(ak) isn't a part of s(ak*)(c) or s( ak*) isn't vivid for c],
or
(iii) [aŒ{pres, past} and s(ak*)(s(ci)) is entirely after
(s(ci))T] or [aŒ{ind} and (s(ci))W isn't a part of
s(ak*)(s(ci))].
Otherwise ak*, i denotess, c* s(ak*)(s(ci))
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Note: (i) is the only constraint that would hold if the De Re Transformation
had not been applied. (ii) is the requirement that s(ak*) be a vivid name of
s(ak) for the agent of the attitude, at the time of the attitude and at the world of
the attitude. (iii) is a generalized version of the Upper Limit Constraint,
applied both to tense and to mood. (Note that the subjunctive, as the future,
does not have to obey this constraint).
futk*,i(t) denotess, c*# iff (i) t denotess, c* # or
(ii) t denotess, c* a moment t and s(tk*)(s(ci)) is not
entirely after t, or
(iii) there is a context c corresponding to <i, t, w> and
[s(tk) isn't a part of s(tk*)(c) or s(tk*) isn't vivid for c].
Otherwise fut k*, i(t) denotess, c* s(xk*)(s(ci))
q Truth
Same rules as in A.
® Examples
In the following examples, a. is the English sentence to be analyzed, b. its
counterpart produced by the fragment in A., c. the result of applying the De Re
Transformation to b. The truth-conditions of c. are given in d., while the
pronunciation is found in e.
(vi) Tense Agreement and a De Re pronoun
a. He thought that she was pregnant (De Re for the embedded she, De Se
for the embedded past tense)












d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not before
c*T or s(w1) is not c*W or there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for some c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x2*) isn't vivid for c or s(x2) is not a part of
s(x2*)(c)].
Otherwise (c) is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every context c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x2*)(c'), c'T,
c'W> satisfies be-pregnant.
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-past-ind
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Note: In the 'weirdness' conditions,  the quantification over contexts in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> is in this case vacuous and could thus be eliminated.
(vii) A Double Access Reading with Tense
a. He thought that she is pregnant (De Re for the embedded she and  for
the embedded present tense)








d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not before
c*T or s(w1) is not c*W or there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for some c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x2*) isn't vivid for c' or s(x2) is not a part of
s(x2*)(c)], or
 (i') s(t2) is not c*T, or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(t2*) isn't vivid for c or s(t2) is not a part of
s(t2*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(t2*)(c') is entirely after c'T
Otherwise (c) is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every context c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x2*)(c'),
s(t2*)(c'), c'W> satisfies be-pregnant.
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-pres-ind
Note: In the 'weirdness' conditions the quantification over contexts in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> is in this case not vacuous, since clause (iii') (the Upper
Limit Constraint) depends on it.
(viii) A (failed) Forward Shifted Reading
a. #He thought (in 1990) that she was pregnant (in 2000) (De Re for the
embedded she and  for the embedded past tense)








d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not before
c*T or s(w1) is not c*W or there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for some c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to
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<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x2*) isn't vivid for c or s(x2) is not a part of
s(x2*)(c)], or
 (i') s(t2) is not before c*T, or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(t2*) isn't vivid for c or s(t2) is not a part of
s(t2*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(t2*)(c') is entirely after c'T
 e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-pres-ind
Note: For the sentence to be acceptable s(t2*) must be such that: (i) s(t2*)(c')
does not lie after c'T, for each c' in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>, and (ii) s(t2*)(c) includes
s(t2*) (i.e. yesterday), where c is the context corresponding to the agent's
attitude.  Thus if the agent is not mistaken about the time (i.e. if for each c' in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>  c'T= s(t1), which is ten years ago), his thought must be that
the woman's pregnancy spans ten years, which is not reasonable. This
accounts for the deviance of the example.
(ix) A (successful) Forward Shifted Reading
a. He thought (in 1990) that she would be pregnant (in 2000) (De Re for
the embedded she and  for the embedded past tense)












d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not before
c*T or s(w1) is not c*W or there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for some c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to





T denotes s[c1Æc'], c* # (impossible), or
 (ii') s(t2*)(s(c1)) is not after (s(c1))T, or
 (iii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(t2*) isn't vivid for c or s(t2) isn't a part of
s(t2*)(c)].
Otherwise (c) is trues, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> s(x2*)(c) is pregnant at
s(t2*)(c') in c'W.
 e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that  she be-pregnant-fut(past)-ind
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Note: The Upper Limit Constraint does not play any role in this example
because the embedded past tense of (viii) has been replaced with fut2(c1
F
T)
(pronounced as fut(past) because of the agreement rule).
(x) Mood Agreement
a. (Il faut qu') il pense qu'elle soit enceinte
(It is necessary that) he think-subj that she be-subj pregnant











d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not c*T or
there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1) in s(w1) and for some c' in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to <s(x1),
s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x2*) isn't vivid for c or s(x2) is not a part of s(x2*)(c)].
Otherwise (c) is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every context c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x2*)(c'), c'T,
c'W> satisfies be-pregnant.
e. Pronunciation: he think-pres-subj that  she be-pregnant-pres-subj
Note: Even if we had given a more sophisticated analysis of mood in which
the subjunctive imposed some interpretive condition on world variables, this
condition would not have been felt in this example because the features of the
embedded subjunctive are present in the pronunciation only.
(xi) A Double Access Reading with Mood
a. (Il faut qu') il pense qu'elle est enceinte
(It is necessary that) he think-subj that she is-ind pregnant
b. he1 think-pres1-subj1 thatc1F  she2 be-pregnant-c1
F
T-ind2,  with F=<he,
pres, subj>
c. he1 think-pres1-subj1 thatc1F  she2*, 1 be-pregnant-c1
F
T- ind2*, 1, with
F=<he, pres, subj>
d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1) is not c*T or
there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1) in s(w1) and for some c' in
think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
 (i) s(x2) is not female at c*T in c*W, or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x2*) isn't vivid for c or s(x2) is not a part of
s(x2*)(c)], or
 (i') s(w2) is not c*W, or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(w2*) isn't vivid for c or s(w2) is not a part of
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s(w2*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(w2*)(c') does not contain c'W
Otherwise (c) is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every context c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x2*)(c'), c'T,
s(w2*)(c')> satisfies be-pregnant.
e. Pronunciation: he think-pres-subj that  she be-pregnant-pres-ind
Note: It might be helpful to consider some values of s(w2*) that would be
allowed by conditions (i')-(iii') above (since each of these is sufficient to
trigger referential failure, s(w2*) is allowed by these conditions just in case it
satisfies the conjunction of their negations). Suppose the agent of the attitude
(call him 'John') thinks: 'Mary is pregnant in the worlds in which she displays
the same symptoms as in this world'. Then the relevant description of worlds,
s(w2*), is the function: lc the group of all worlds w such that Mary displays in
w the same symptoms as in cW. On the assumption that s(w2*) is not ruled out
by condition (i'), and thus that s(w2)=c*W, we have that:
-Condition (iii') is automatically satisfied: for each c' in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>,
s(w2*)(c') contains c'W, since (vacuously) Mary displays in c'W the same
symptoms as in c'W.
-If there is a context c corresponding to <s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)>, Condition (ii')
requires that s(w2) (that is, c*W) be part of s(w2*)(c), i.e. of the worlds in which
Mary has the same symptoms as in s(w1). In other words, Mary must display
the same symptoms in s(w1) as she does in the actual world c*W.
On the assumption that the salient description of worlds s(w2*) is as above, we
may apply a standard mechanism of presupposition projection to obtain the
following result:
Presupposition: every world compatible with what the speaker considers to be
desirable is one in which Mary has the same symptoms as in the actual world.
Assertion: In every world compatible with what the speaker considers to be
desirable, John thinks: 'Mary is pregnant in the worlds in which she displays
the same symptoms as in this world'20.
Arguably this is a correct result: to the extent that we have intuitions on (xi)a,
it would appear that it is indeed presupposed that the speaker 'talks about'
worlds in which Mary has the same symptoms as in the actual world.
C. De Se Readings as a Species of De Re Readings
                                                 
20 The present analysis would have to be extended to provide a full account of those examples
in which the non-bracketed part of (xi)a is embedded in the antecedent of a counterfactual
conditional, as in (32)b above.
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The vocabulary and syntax are the same as in Appendix B, except that the
symbol '*' can optionally be replaced with the symbol '+'.   Everything else
remains the same, except the definition of denotation, to which the following
clause must be added:
ak+, i  denotess, c* # iff (i) ak denotess, c* #, or
(ii) there is a context c corresponding to <i, t, w> and
[s(ak) isn't a part of s(ak*)(c) or s(ak*) isn't vivid for c],
or
(iii) [aŒ{pres, past} and s(ak*)(s(ci)) is entirely after
(s(ci))T] or [aŒ{ind} and (s(ci))W isn't a part of
s(ak*)(s(ci))], or
(iv) s(ak*)œ{lc cA, lc cT, lc cW}
Otherwise ak*, i denotess, c* s(xk*)(s(ci))
Remarks
(i) As it stands the system will over-generate, since it has the resources to




A ,  ci
F
T ,  ci
F
W, but also (b) through De Re terms with an additional constraint,
of the form ak+, i.  We could decide to eliminate the diacritic F=<he, pres, ind>
and the context terms ckFA , c kFT , c kFW; this would have no undesirable
consequences, except for the account of Kamp & Rohrer's example in (iv),
since the most embedded past tense features cannot be analyzed as being
interpreted De Re (whether or not this De Re is of the De Se variety).
(ii) The system could be set up in a different way, by re-defining the notion of
an assignment so that each variable xi+  is assigned the value s(xi+)=lc cA, each
variable ti+  is assigned the value s(ti+)=lc cT, and each variable wi+  is
assigned the value s(wi+)=lc cW. This would also emphasize the great
similarity between, say, a term xi+, k  and the term c FA used in Appendix A and
Appendix B.
(xii) a. He hopes that he is elected  / He hopes that he himself is elected / He
hopes to be elected (De Se Reading for each of the embedded
arguments)
b. he1 think-pres1-ind1 thatc1F he1 be-elected-pres1-ind1, with F=<he, pres,
ind>
c. he1 think-past1-ind1 thatc1F he1+, 1 be-elected-pres1+, 1-ind1+, 1, with
F=<he, past, ind>
d. (c) is weirds, c* iff s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W or s(t1)≠c*T or
s(w1)≠c*W or there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1) in s(w1) and
for some c' in think<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> : 
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 (i) s(x1) is not male at c*T in c*W
(redundant), or
   (ii) there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(x1*) isn't vivid for c or s(x1) is not a part of
s(x1*)(c)], or
 (iii) s(x1*)œ{lc cA, lc cT, lc cW} (since
s(x1*) is a function from contexts to individuals, it could only be
identical to lc cA)
 (i') s(t1) is not c*T, (redundant), or
 (ii') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(t1*) isn't vivid for c or s(t1) is not a part of
s(t1*)(c)], or
 (iii') s(t1*)(c') is entirely after c'T
 (iv') s(t1*)œ{lc cA, lc cT, lc cW} (since
s(t1*) is a function from contexts to moments, it could only be identical
to lc cT,), or
 (i'') s(w1 is not c*W, (redundant) or
 (ii'') there is a context c corresponding to
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> and [s(w1*) isn't vivid for c or s(w1) is not a part of
s(w1*)(c)], or
 (iii'') s(w1*)(c') does not contain c'W
 (iv'') s(w1*)œ{lc cA, lc cT, lc cW} (since
s(w1*) is a function from contexts to worlds, it could only be identical to
lc cW,)
Otherwise (c) is true s, c* iff there is an attitude of thinking by s(x1) at s(t1)
in s(w1) and for every context c' in think
<s(x1), s(t1), s(w1)> , <s(x1*)(c'),
s(t1*)(c'), s(w1*)(c')> , i.e. when the sentence is not weird s, c* (because
s(x1*), s(t1*), s(w1*) must be lc cA, lc cT, lc cW respectively) <c'A, c'T,
c'W> satisfies be-elected.
e. Pronunciation: he think-past-ind that he be-elected-pres-ind
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